Beschreibung
In the wake of the active inference framework, two popular theories of consciousness highlightthe relevance of insular cortex for interoceptive self-modeling (Fermin et al., 2022; Seth, 2021) and
subcortical brain regions for qualitative experience (Solms, 2021). Both provide a compelling eco-
logical argument for integrated conscious experience, i.e., self-organization of complex organisms
with optimization goals that are usually parallel, multifaceted, and hard to reconcile. Computa-
tionally, both theories require some kind of self-model as basis, which could contradict credible
reports of minimal phenomenal experience (MPE) (Metzinger, 2024). However, duality of con-
scious experience could be explained by a neuroscientific theory of two distinct brain networks
emerging from different neurodevelopmental pathways, leading to marked differences in cyto-
architecture and function (Luu et al., 2024; Sanides, 1962). System-A, originating from an olfactory
system and amygdala-centered expansion gradient towards ventral cortex, could enable intero-
ceptive self-modeling for habitual interactions with the body and the world. System-H, hippo-
campus-centered towards dorsal cortex, could enable less egocentric forms of cognition and ex-
perience. In this sense, MPE could be a less salient/habitual form of experience, when neither
interoceptive/exteroceptive prediction errors nor spontaneous episodic memory reactivation
provide self-referential engagement of System-A. System-H, if not operating on content, could
give rise to self-less experience of the world as such.
| Zeitraum | 26 Sept. 2024 |
|---|---|
| Ereignistitel | Models of Consciousness 2024 |
| Veranstaltungstyp | Konferenz |
| Ort | Bamberg, DeutschlandAuf Karte anzeigen |
| Bekanntheitsgrad | International |