Projektdetails
Abstract
1) Wider research context / theoretical framework
The best arguments for incompatibilism about free will—from logical fatalism, theological fatalism,
determinism, and indeterminism—all share a common logical structure. They crucially rely on a 'closure' principle: if an agent has no choice about p, and p necessarily implies q, then the agent has no choice about q. This principle (CLOSURE) is often presupposed, yet its validity depends on the logic of the 'no choice' operator (N). Standard debates overlook the intensional or hyperintensional nature of N and the important implications thereof for such arguments. The project brings this issue into focus within the broader context of modal logic and recent work on intensionality and hyperintensionality.
2) Hypotheses / research questions / objectives
The project hypothesizes that the validity of CLOSURE can be formally derived under minimal logical
assumptions if N is an intensional operator. The main questions are: (1) Is CLOSURE valid under this
assumption? (2) Do known counterexamples to CLOSURE stem from the hyperintensionality of N? (3) Can weaker principles support novel incompatibilist arguments? (4) What are the consequences of treating N as a hyperintensional operator? The project aims to evaluate the formal status of key incompatibilist arguments by identifying the logical conditions under which they hold.
3) Approach / methods
Using tools from modal logic and formal semantics, the project analyzes existing and recent arguments in the literature, isolates their logical conditions, and reconstructs them within frameworks that are either explicitly intensional or hyperintensional. It develops a general proof—called the intensional argument—that shows that CLOSURE follows from the intensionality of N and its distribution over conjunctions. Alternative arguments using weaker closure principles are also formulated and evaluated.
4) Level of originality / innovation
The project introduces a new, general approach and focus to arguments for incompatibilism grounded in formal logic. While standard views rely on intuitive premises or specific interpretations of what free choice is, this project clarifies how more fundamental logical properties of N (especially intensionality) determine the success of the major arguments in the literature. It also proposes new arguments for incompatibilism and identifies hyperintensionality as a possible key source of failure for extant incompatibilist arguments. The project bridges metaphysics, philosophy of language, and logic.
5) Primary researchers involved
Dr. Fabio Lampert (Principal Investigator) is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Vienna and has published widely on free will, modality, and formal logic. Prof. Dr. Max Kölbel (University of Vienna) will serve as mentor, contributing expertise in semantics and philosophical logic.
The best arguments for incompatibilism about free will—from logical fatalism, theological fatalism,
determinism, and indeterminism—all share a common logical structure. They crucially rely on a 'closure' principle: if an agent has no choice about p, and p necessarily implies q, then the agent has no choice about q. This principle (CLOSURE) is often presupposed, yet its validity depends on the logic of the 'no choice' operator (N). Standard debates overlook the intensional or hyperintensional nature of N and the important implications thereof for such arguments. The project brings this issue into focus within the broader context of modal logic and recent work on intensionality and hyperintensionality.
2) Hypotheses / research questions / objectives
The project hypothesizes that the validity of CLOSURE can be formally derived under minimal logical
assumptions if N is an intensional operator. The main questions are: (1) Is CLOSURE valid under this
assumption? (2) Do known counterexamples to CLOSURE stem from the hyperintensionality of N? (3) Can weaker principles support novel incompatibilist arguments? (4) What are the consequences of treating N as a hyperintensional operator? The project aims to evaluate the formal status of key incompatibilist arguments by identifying the logical conditions under which they hold.
3) Approach / methods
Using tools from modal logic and formal semantics, the project analyzes existing and recent arguments in the literature, isolates their logical conditions, and reconstructs them within frameworks that are either explicitly intensional or hyperintensional. It develops a general proof—called the intensional argument—that shows that CLOSURE follows from the intensionality of N and its distribution over conjunctions. Alternative arguments using weaker closure principles are also formulated and evaluated.
4) Level of originality / innovation
The project introduces a new, general approach and focus to arguments for incompatibilism grounded in formal logic. While standard views rely on intuitive premises or specific interpretations of what free choice is, this project clarifies how more fundamental logical properties of N (especially intensionality) determine the success of the major arguments in the literature. It also proposes new arguments for incompatibilism and identifies hyperintensionality as a possible key source of failure for extant incompatibilist arguments. The project bridges metaphysics, philosophy of language, and logic.
5) Primary researchers involved
Dr. Fabio Lampert (Principal Investigator) is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Vienna and has published widely on free will, modality, and formal logic. Prof. Dr. Max Kölbel (University of Vienna) will serve as mentor, contributing expertise in semantics and philosophical logic.
| Kurztitel | Incompatibilism and Intensionality |
|---|---|
| Status | Laufend |
| Tatsächlicher Beginn/ -es Ende | 1/04/26 → 31/03/29 |