Another argument against uniqueness

Thomas Raleigh

Veröffentlichungen: Beitrag in FachzeitschriftArtikelPeer Reviewed

Abstract

I present an argument against the thesis of Uniqueness and in favour of Permissivism. Counterexamples to Uniqueness are provided, based on ‘Safespot’ propositions—i.e., a proposition that is guaranteed to be true provided the subject adopts a certain attitude towards it. The argument relies on a plausible principle (roughly stated): If S knows that her believing p would be a true belief, then it is rationally permitted for S to believe p. One motivation for denying this principle—viz opposition to ‘epistemic consequentialism’—is briefly discussed. The principle is extended to cover degrees of belief and compared with a couple of other well-known constraints on rational degrees of belief.
OriginalspracheEnglisch
Seiten (von - bis)327-346
Seitenumfang20
FachzeitschriftThe Philosophical Quarterly
Jahrgang67
Ausgabenummer267
DOIs
PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - 1 Apr. 2017

ÖFOS 2012

  • 603113 Philosophie

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