@techreport{98df3ba44d204197b551c7e14ae34430,
title = "Disincentives from Redistribution: Evidence on a Dividend of Democracy",
abstract = "We experimentally study the disincentive effect of taxing work and redistributing tax revenues when redistribution is imposed vs. democratically chosen in a vote. We find a {"}dividend of democracy{"} in the sense that the disincentive effect is substantially smaller when redistribution is chosen in a vote than when it is imposed. Redistribution seems to be more legitimate, and hence less demotivating, when accepted in a vote.",
keywords = "disincentive effect, Lab Experiment, Legitimacy, Real effort task, redistribution, voting",
author = "Rupert Sausgruber and Axel Sonntag and Jean-Robert Tyran",
year = "2019",
language = "English",
series = "Discussion papers / Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen",
publisher = "University of Copenhagen",
number = "19-08",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "University of Copenhagen",
}