TY - JOUR
T1 - Disruption of dopamine D2/D3 system function impairs the human ability to understand the mental states of other people
AU - Schuster, Bianca
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2024 Schuster et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
PY - 2024/6/13
Y1 - 2024/6/13
N2 - Difficulties in reasoning about others’ mental states (i.e., mentalising/Theory of Mind) are highly prevalent among disorders featuring dopamine dysfunctions (e.g., Parkinson’s dis- ease) and significantly affect individuals’ quality of life. However, due to multiple confound- ing factors inherent to existing patient studies, currently little is known about whether these sociocognitive symptoms originate from aberrant dopamine signalling or from psychosocial changes unrelated to dopamine. The present study, therefore, investigated the role of dopa- mine in modulating mentalising in a sample of healthy volunteers. We used a double-blind, placebo-controlled procedure to test the effect of the D2/D3 antagonist haloperidol on men- tal state attribution, using an adaptation of the Heider and Simmel (1944) animations task. On 2 separate days, once after receiving 2.5 mg haloperidol and once after receiving pla- cebo, 33 healthy adult participants viewed and labelled short videos of 2 triangles depicting mental state (involving mentalistic interaction wherein 1 triangle intends to cause or act upon a particular mental state in the other, e.g., surprising) and non-mental state (involving reciprocal interaction without the intention to cause/act upon the other triangle’s mental state, e.g., following) interactions. Using Bayesian mixed effects models, we observed that haloperidol decreased accuracy in labelling both mental and non-mental state animations. Our secondary analyses suggest that dopamine modulates inference from mental and non- mental state animations via independent mechanisms, pointing towards 2 putative path- ways underlying the dopaminergic modulation of mental state attribution: action representa- tion and a shared mechanism supporting mentalising and emotion recognition. We conclude that dopaminergic pathways impact Theory of Mind, at least indirectly. Our results have implications for the neurochemical basis of sociocognitive difficulties in patients with dopamine dysfunctions and generate new hypotheses about the specific dopamine-medi- ated mechanisms underlying social cognition.
AB - Difficulties in reasoning about others’ mental states (i.e., mentalising/Theory of Mind) are highly prevalent among disorders featuring dopamine dysfunctions (e.g., Parkinson’s dis- ease) and significantly affect individuals’ quality of life. However, due to multiple confound- ing factors inherent to existing patient studies, currently little is known about whether these sociocognitive symptoms originate from aberrant dopamine signalling or from psychosocial changes unrelated to dopamine. The present study, therefore, investigated the role of dopa- mine in modulating mentalising in a sample of healthy volunteers. We used a double-blind, placebo-controlled procedure to test the effect of the D2/D3 antagonist haloperidol on men- tal state attribution, using an adaptation of the Heider and Simmel (1944) animations task. On 2 separate days, once after receiving 2.5 mg haloperidol and once after receiving pla- cebo, 33 healthy adult participants viewed and labelled short videos of 2 triangles depicting mental state (involving mentalistic interaction wherein 1 triangle intends to cause or act upon a particular mental state in the other, e.g., surprising) and non-mental state (involving reciprocal interaction without the intention to cause/act upon the other triangle’s mental state, e.g., following) interactions. Using Bayesian mixed effects models, we observed that haloperidol decreased accuracy in labelling both mental and non-mental state animations. Our secondary analyses suggest that dopamine modulates inference from mental and non- mental state animations via independent mechanisms, pointing towards 2 putative path- ways underlying the dopaminergic modulation of mental state attribution: action representa- tion and a shared mechanism supporting mentalising and emotion recognition. We conclude that dopaminergic pathways impact Theory of Mind, at least indirectly. Our results have implications for the neurochemical basis of sociocognitive difficulties in patients with dopamine dysfunctions and generate new hypotheses about the specific dopamine-medi- ated mechanisms underlying social cognition.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85196040338
U2 - 10.1371/journal.pbio.3002652
DO - 10.1371/journal.pbio.3002652
M3 - Article
SN - 1545-7885
VL - 22
JO - PLoS Biology
JF - PLoS Biology
IS - 6
M1 - e3002652
ER -