Abstract
Do voters punish political leaders in the aftermath of a natural disaster? Using a Regression Discontinuity Design, this article explores how floods affect local electoral results in Chile. Taking data from polling stations, our estimations show that, floods reduce the likelihood of incumbent candidates’ chances of winning in affected polling stations in a range from 11.3% to 22%, depending on the bandwidth considered. It also follows from our results that the greater the electoral competition, the greater the probability of losing the next race. The paper explores the electoral mechanism and finds that turnout is significantly lower in affected areas, pointing to voter dissatisfaction as an explanatory factor.
| Originalsprache | Englisch |
|---|---|
| Seiten (von - bis) | 1233-1238 |
| Seitenumfang | 6 |
| Fachzeitschrift | Applied Economics Letters |
| Jahrgang | 32 |
| Ausgabenummer | 9 |
| DOIs | |
| Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - 2025 |
Fördermittel
This work was supported by the Margarita Salas, Ministry of Universities and the European Union, Funded by the European Union-Next GenerationEU. In addition, the authors are grateful for the support of the Human Security, Local Human Development and International Cooperation research group of the Basque University System (IT1434-22). International Cooperation of the Basque University System (IT1434-22).
ÖFOS 2012
- 502027 Politische Ökonomie
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