Abstract
This paper introduces and evaluates a possible truthmaking argument for a robust conception
of aboutness commitment. According to the argument, the pure aboutness-based account of
truthmaking and the thesis of Truthmaker Commitment entails that a truthbearer is
ontologically committed to what it is about in an appropriate sense of “aboutness”. However,
this argument encounters challenges, notably an inherent explanatory circularity within the
robust conception of aboutness commitment, and a radical inconsistency between its two
premises in terms of their underlying motivations. To address these issues, this paper
proposes a more moderate conception of aboutness commitment, drawing inspiration from B.
Smith’s mixed aboutness-based account of truthmaking. According to this moderate proposal,
the representationalist notion of intended aboutness, or the anti-representationalist notion of
general aboutness, constrains, but does not determine, the notion of ontological commitment,
which in turn contributes to a stronger notion of genuine or satisfied aboutness. This modified
moderate conception not only sidesteps the explanatory circularity, but also aligns more
closely with the objective of providing a fundamental ontology. Therefore, it is recommended
as a fitting approach to engaging in the relation between aboutness and ontological
commitment.
of aboutness commitment. According to the argument, the pure aboutness-based account of
truthmaking and the thesis of Truthmaker Commitment entails that a truthbearer is
ontologically committed to what it is about in an appropriate sense of “aboutness”. However,
this argument encounters challenges, notably an inherent explanatory circularity within the
robust conception of aboutness commitment, and a radical inconsistency between its two
premises in terms of their underlying motivations. To address these issues, this paper
proposes a more moderate conception of aboutness commitment, drawing inspiration from B.
Smith’s mixed aboutness-based account of truthmaking. According to this moderate proposal,
the representationalist notion of intended aboutness, or the anti-representationalist notion of
general aboutness, constrains, but does not determine, the notion of ontological commitment,
which in turn contributes to a stronger notion of genuine or satisfied aboutness. This modified
moderate conception not only sidesteps the explanatory circularity, but also aligns more
closely with the objective of providing a fundamental ontology. Therefore, it is recommended
as a fitting approach to engaging in the relation between aboutness and ontological
commitment.
| Originalsprache | Englisch |
|---|---|
| Titel | Facets of Reality |
| Untertitel | Contemporary Debates. Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society |
| Erscheinungsort | Kirchberg am Wechsel |
| Verlag | The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society |
| Seiten | 868-877 |
| Seitenumfang | 10 |
| ISBN (Print) | 978-3-9505512-2-8 |
| Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - 2024 |
Publikationsreihe
| Reihe | Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig-Wittgenstein-Gesellschaft |
|---|---|
| Band | 15 |
| ISSN | 1022-3398 |
ÖFOS 2012
- 603110 Metaphysik
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