TY - JOUR
T1 - Justifying an invasion
T2 - When is disinformation successful?
AU - Zilinsky, Jan
AU - Theocharis, Yannis
AU - Pradel-Sinaci, Franziska
AU - Tulin, Marina
AU - de Vreese, Claes
AU - Aalberg, Toril
AU - Cardenal, Ana S.
AU - Corbu, Nicoleta
AU - Esser, Frank
AU - Gehle , Luisa
AU - Halagiera, Denis
AU - Hameleers, Michael
AU - Hopmann, David Nicolas
AU - Koc-Michalska, Karolina
AU - Matthes, Jörg
AU - Schemer, Christian
AU - Stetka, Václav
AU - Strömbäck, Jesper
AU - Terren, Ludovic
AU - Splendore, Sergio
AU - Stanyer, James
AU - Stępińska, Agnieszka
AU - van Aelst, Peter
AU - Zoizner, Alon
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© Copyright © 2024 The Author(s). Published with license by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
PY - 2024/12
Y1 - 2024/12
N2 - Conventional wisdom suggests that social media, especially when used by authoritarian powers with nefarious aims, leaves citizens of democratic countries vulnerable to psychological influence campaigns. But such concerns overlook predispositions among recipients of false claims to reject (or to endorse) conspiratorial narratives. Analyzing responses from a survey fielded in 19 countries, we find that it is a preexisting conspiracy outlook at the individual level, more so than media diets, which consistently predicts rating Russia’s pretenses for the invasion as more accurate. In all countries, individuals who view the world in general with a conspiratorial mindset are more likely to believe war-related disinformation. Receiving news via YouTube, Facebook, or TikTok is also associated with greater belief in Russian narratives justifying the invasion in several countries, but these relationships are weaker compared to those observed for conspiracy thinking. Without downplaying a potential positive role for media interventions, the findings highlight the importance of a deeper understanding of the underlying causes of conspiratorial thinking.
AB - Conventional wisdom suggests that social media, especially when used by authoritarian powers with nefarious aims, leaves citizens of democratic countries vulnerable to psychological influence campaigns. But such concerns overlook predispositions among recipients of false claims to reject (or to endorse) conspiratorial narratives. Analyzing responses from a survey fielded in 19 countries, we find that it is a preexisting conspiracy outlook at the individual level, more so than media diets, which consistently predicts rating Russia’s pretenses for the invasion as more accurate. In all countries, individuals who view the world in general with a conspiratorial mindset are more likely to believe war-related disinformation. Receiving news via YouTube, Facebook, or TikTok is also associated with greater belief in Russian narratives justifying the invasion in several countries, but these relationships are weaker compared to those observed for conspiracy thinking. Without downplaying a potential positive role for media interventions, the findings highlight the importance of a deeper understanding of the underlying causes of conspiratorial thinking.
KW - Ukraine
KW - public opinion
KW - social media
KW - conflict
KW - Conspiracy thinking
KW - Russia
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85193831148&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/10584609.2024.2352483
DO - 10.1080/10584609.2024.2352483
M3 - Article
SN - 1058-4609
VL - 41
SP - 965
EP - 986
JO - Political Communication
JF - Political Communication
IS - 6
ER -