Lessons from utility conservation programs in the United States

Franz Wirl

Veröffentlichungen: Beitrag in FachzeitschriftArtikelPeer Reviewed

Abstract

This paper considers the design, incentives and effectiveness of U.S. demand side management (DSM) programs and tries to explain why this ambitious, almost unanimously embraced initiative failed. Problems on the demand side result from consumers' private information that implies that substantial principal-agent slippage must accompany any conservation incentive the utility offers to the consumer. Moreover, the regulatory incentives induce the American utility to select inefficient programs. Therefore, the utility has little to gain from deterring such strategic reactions and cheating by consumers. As a consequence, the reported conservation exists largely on paper but not in reality. This ex-post assessment is important for two reasons. First, European countries (Scandinavia, Germany, Austria and others) have been eager to repeat this American regulatory `success'. Second, the problems addressed in this paper would apply to another round of conservation programs induced by the concern about global warming.
OriginalspracheEnglisch
Seiten (von - bis)87-108
Seitenumfang22
FachzeitschriftThe Energy Journal
Jahrgang21
Ausgabenummer1
PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - 2000

ÖFOS 2012

  • 5020 Wirtschaftswissenschaften

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