Luminous, Ergo Bright Beliefs

A state is luminous if and only if, whenever one is in it, one is in a position to know that one is. A state is bright if and only if, whenever one is in it, one is in a position to believe that one is. Beliefs have long been regarded, both historically and from a contemporary perspective, as luminous and bright. This paper evaluates Timothy Williamson’s influential anti-luminosity arguments as they apply to the luminosity and brightness of belief. While his margin-for-error argument may effectively challenge the luminosity of knowledge, it cannot be straightforwardly extended to undermine either the luminosity or the brightness of belief. Some authors responded to the more general anti-luminosity argument based on a constitutive connection between states and attitudes. An influential reply on Williamson’s behalf by Srinavasan in terms of degrees of confidence opens way to the claim that there is a constitutive connection between confidence and belief. The more general argument, in the specific case of belief, can then be resisted by drawing on independently defensible views of how we form beliefs about our own beliefs.