Abstract
Can a history of evasion affect tax compliance after a major institutional reform? We address this question in a novel laboratory experiment varying the quality of past and present institutions. We find that past institutions continue to exert considerable influence on individuals’ expectations about others’ compliance even after a major, common-knowledge institutional change. Consequently, we observe low compliance in good-quality institutions when there is a history of evasion, but high compliance when there is no such history. These findings suggest that history should not be ignored as it is in traditional models of compliance: the higher evasion has been historically, the stronger incentives may need to be to overcome the “ghost of institutions past”. We show that a society-wide poll in which individuals express their attitudes toward compliance can help break the link with the past.
| Originalsprache | Englisch |
|---|---|
| Aufsatznummer | 103641 |
| Seitenumfang | 17 |
| Fachzeitschrift | European Economic Review |
| Jahrgang | 132 |
| DOIs | |
| Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - Feb. 2021 |
ÖFOS 2012
- 502045 Verhaltensökonomie
Schlagwörter
- tax evasion
- Interdependence
- multiple equilibria
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