Abstract
Together, the European Parliament (EP) and the Council form the bicameral legislature of the European Union (EU). However, as the analysis of voting behaviour shows, decision-making is structured differently in the two institutions. In the EP, competition takes place between European party groups along a left-right and a rising pro-anti EU integration dimension. In the Council, ideology and party politics play a minor role. Voting behaviour of ministers is determined by different national interests on an issue-by-issue basis. Furthermore, voting in the Council is dominated by the so-called “culture of consensus”. Despite the extension of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) to most areas of EU decision-making, many legislative proposals are adopted unanimously. Even if there is dissent, it is usually only one or two member states voting against the proposal. This makes it difficult to discover patterns of conflict and coalition formation through Council voting data. At the same time, consensus-seeking is something the Council and the EP have in common. In the EP, voting cohesion is not only high within groups, but also in the EP plenary as a whole, with the grand coalition between Social Democrats and Conservatives forming frequently, often including the liberal ALDE as well as parties on the left side of the political spectrum. Notwithstanding signs of a decline in consensual decision-making in the wake of the financial and the migration crisis, voting cohesion dominates not only within the Council and the EP, but also across institutions in bicameral decision-making.
Originalsprache | Englisch |
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Fachzeitschrift | Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics |
Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - 2019 |
ÖFOS 2012
- 506004 Europäische Integration
Schlagwörter
- WiSoz