Where Power Resides in Committees

Georg D. Granic, Alexander K. Wagner

Veröffentlichungen: Beitrag in FachzeitschriftArtikelPeer Reviewed

Abstract

The power to control decisions is rarely distributed equally in committees. In a small voting committee, in which members have conflicting interests, we study how the decision right to break ties (formal power) translates into effective control over outcomes (real power). Two controlled experiments show that the level of real power held by the chair is larger than predicted by rational-choice theory. We also provide causal evidence that the legitimacy, but not the salience, of holding formal tie-breaking power affects voting behavior and thus the distribution of real power in the committee. Attitudinal measures related to the perceived attractiveness of the decision right to break ties exhibit a strong asymmetry between the one holding the decision right and those who do not.
OriginalspracheEnglisch
Aufsatznummer101285
Seitenumfang15
FachzeitschriftThe Leadership Quarterly
Jahrgang32
Ausgabenummer4
Frühes Online-Datum8 März 2019
DOIs
PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - Aug. 2021

ÖFOS 2012

  • 502045 Verhaltensökonomie
  • 502057 Experimentelle Ökonomie
  • 502027 Politische Ökonomie

Schlagwörter

  • Laboratory Experiment
  • Leadership
  • Committee
  • Power
  • Tie-breaking rule
  • Legitimacy

Zitationsweisen