Wittgenstein e l'epistemologia del disaccordo

Veröffentlichungen: Beitrag in FachzeitschriftArtikelPeer Reviewed

Abstract

My main aim in this paper is to initiate a dialogue between Wittgenstein and present-day social epistemology on the issue of religious disagreement. I will use the contemporary discussions to reconstruct Wittgenstein's position on religious disagreement and, at the same time, I will try to indicate where Wittgenstein differs from well-known positions in this discourse. I will argue for four interpretative theses. First, Wittgenstein insists that the religious believer has extraordinary belief attitudes; second, he deems full disclosure of evidence for extraordinary beliefs impossible; third, faced with an epistemic peer who holds extraordinary beliefs, Wittgenstein opts neither for suspension of judgments nor for demotion of the religious believer's epistemic credentials; and fourth, he leans towards a form of relativism.

Titel in ÜbersetzungWittgenstein and the epistemology of peer disagreement
OriginalspracheItalienisch
Seiten (von - bis)555-576
Seitenumfang22
FachzeitschriftIride: Filosofia E Discussione Pubblica
Jahrgang27
Ausgabenummer3
DOIs
PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - 2014

ÖFOS 2012

  • 603124 Wissenschaftstheorie

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