Wittgenstein on Mathematics and Certainties

Veröffentlichungen: Beitrag in FachzeitschriftArtikelPeer Reviewed


This paper aims to contribute to the debate over epistemic versus non-epistemic readings of the ‘hinges’ in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. I follow Marie McGinn’s and Daniele Moyal-Sharrock’s lead in developing an analogy between mathematical sentences and certainties, and using the former as a model for the latter. However, I disagree with McGinn’s and Moyal-Sharrock’s interpretations concerning Wittgenstein’s views of both relata. I argue that mathematical sentences as well as certainties are true and are propositions; that some of them can be epistemically justified; that in some senses they are not prior to empirical knowledge; that they are not ineffable; and that their primary function is epistemic as much as it is semantic.
Seiten (von - bis)120-142
FachzeitschriftInternational Journal for the Study of Skepticism
PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - 2016

ÖFOS 2012

  • 603113 Philosophie