Description
I will explore the way that meaning is related to signs via rules. To do so, I will discuss Frege's colleague Johannes Thomae, who claimed that arithmetic is "a game with signs" which are "empty" except for content "attributed to them with respect to their behaviour under certain combinatorial rules". Thomae explained this claim by comparing the signs of arithmetic to pieces in chess. Frege argued that the analogy can't do what Thomae wanted: arbitrary rules never suffice to give signs meaning.In response to Frege's objection, I will argue that Thomae's understanding of arithmetical signs is rooted in Kant's understanding of algebra. On this view, "signs" are not arbitrary, meaningless pieces of syntax, and the role of rules is not to create content where there was none before. Instead, signs are representations with a non-arbitrary, non-linguistic relationship to the concepts they signify. In addition to making better sense of Thomae's view, this interpretation opens up a route for progress on an issue where twentieth century philosophy has gotten stuck: how rules can (and can't) determine meaning.
| Period | 18 Nov 2022 |
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| Held at | Department of Philosophy |