Distributive Preferences and Needs-Based Justice in Networks

The research group “Needs-based Justice and Distributive Procedures” intends to contribute to a positive and informed normative theory of needs-based justice supported by experimental evidence. This theory aims at providing answers to four questions: (i) How do individual identify needs and which distributions are considered sufficient for identified needs? (ii) Which distributions are collectively recognized and how is the process of recognition organized? (iii) Which dynamics does the process of collective recognition effectuate with regard to the stability of a political agreement? And (iv) What are the consequences of the incentives at the collective and individual level and how sustainable are redistributive agreements? We expect the principle of needs-based justice to minimize the tension between self-interested and strategically induced distributive preferences (social preferences) and ethically reflected principles of justice under two conditions: The recognition of needs takes place in a transparent way (social objectification) and available expert information is optimally used (factual objectification). Answers to the four questions are sought by referring to two core hypotheses: The transparency hypothesis states that the individual and collective recognition of a distributive solution increases with the level of transparency of decision processes. In analogy, the expertise hypothesis states that the objectification of decisions to recognize needs by reference to expertise increases the acceptance of a distributive solution. Each of eight interdisciplinary projects focuses on one of the four research questions from the perspective of one of the two hypotheses. Project B1 “Distributive Preferences and Needs-based Justice in Networks” uses a theory-driven experimental approach to study the recognition of needs as legitimate claims in the context of network structures and the consequences thereof on the outcome of bilateral distributional negotiations. Building on sociological network exchange theory, we analyse the effect of network structures, the transparency of structures for the actors involved, the number of possible bilateral agreements, and social preferences of position holders on the observance of needs in distributional agreements. Assuming self-interested, utility-maximizing behaviour, equality in distributional outcomes tends to be generated by balanced power relations and information on the network structure. Unbalanced power networks, however, promote highly skewed distributions in favour of high-power positions. While this general pattern has been supported by repeated experiments, other network experiments, however, reveal systematic deviations from these expectations. In particular, holders of structural power positions tend to act more pro-socially under certain context conditions. The main research question is whether, in contrast to other justice principles, needs-based justice is recognized as a distributive principle in network structures otherwise hostile to redistribution. This result would suggest that needs-based justice principles have a higher potential to legitimize distributions than other principles.