Abstract
This paper expounds and defends a judge-dependence account of aesthetic concepts, where aesthetic concepts are construed widely, to include for example both concepts of personal taste and more narrowly aesthetic concepts. According to such an account, it can depend on personal features of a judge whether it is correct for that judge to apply an aesthetic concept to a given object. After introducing and motivating the account, the article sets out to explain how some aesthetic questions can seem more objective than others, or how there seem to be experts on some aesthetic questions, despite the judge-dependence of aesthetic concepts.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 589-617 |
| Number of pages | 29 |
| Journal | Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy |
| Volume | 59 |
| Issue number | 6 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2016 |
UN SDGs
This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
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SDG 3 Good Health and Well-being
Austrian Fields of Science 2012
- 603120 Philosophy of language
Keywords
- Aesthetic concepts
- DISAGREEMENT
- Hume
- Kant
- Mothersill
- PERSONAL TASTE
- aesthetic expertise
- aesthetic testimony
- judge-dependence
- objectivity
- personal taste
- response-dependence
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