Approximation and characterization of Nash equilibria of large games

  • Guilherme Carmona
  • , Konrad Podczeck

Publications: Contribution to journalArticlePeer Reviewed

Abstract

We characterize Nash equilibria of games with a continuum of players in terms of approximate equilibria of large finite games. This characterization precisely describes the relationship between the equilibrium sets of the two classes of games. In particular, it yields several approximation results for Nash equilibria of games with a continuum of players, which roughly state that all finite-player games that are sufficiently close to a given game with a continuum of players have approximate equilibria that are close to a given Nash equilibrium of the non-atomic game.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)679-694
Number of pages16
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume73
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2020

Austrian Fields of Science 2012

  • 502047 Economic theory

Keywords

  • Approximation
  • CONTINUITY
  • LIMITS
  • Large games
  • NONCOOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIA
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Non-atomic games
  • WALRASIAN EQUILIBRIA

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