Abstract
Hubert Dreyfus argues that explicit thought disrupts smooth coping at both the level of everyday tasks and of highly-refined skills. However, Barbara Montero criticises Dreyfus for extending what she calls the ‘principle of automaticity’ from our everyday actions to those of trained experts. In this paper, I defend Dreyfus’ account while refining his phenomenology. I examine the phenomenology of what I call ‘esoteric’ (as opposed to ‘everyday’) expertise to argue that the explicit thought Montero invokes belongs rather to ‘gaps’ between or above moments of reflexive coping. However, I agree that the ‘principle of automaticity’ does not adequately capture the experience of performing such skills. Drawing on examples of expert performance in sport and improvised music and dance, I argue that esoteric action, at its best, is marked by a distinct state of non-conceptual awareness- an experience of spontaneity, flow and ‘owned-ness’- that distinguishes it from the automaticity of everyday actions.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 403-424 |
Number of pages | 22 |
Journal | Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences |
Volume | 16 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Jul 2017 |
Austrian Fields of Science 2012
- 603112 Phenomenology
- 603114 Philosophy of mind
Keywords
- Authenticity
- Coping
- Dreyfus
- Expertise
- Flow
- Heidegger
- Improvisation
- Montero