Abstract
Nelson Goodman’s paper ‘About’ (1961) was a milestone in aboutness the-ory. Although it has been much discussed, an interesting fact about it has so far been completely ignored: the important debt it owes to two papers it cites by Gilbert Ryle. With Ryle’s ‘About’ (1933) it shares much more than the title – it, too, offers a three-fold account of different ways a sentence can relate to a subject matter and a separate account for fictitious objects. More importantly, although Goodman’s approach is quite different, the inspiration for the crucial element in his account, ‘differential consequence’, may well have come from a parenthetical suggestion of entailment in Ryle’s ‘About’. The second essential tool Goodman uses, viz. compound predi-cates which incorporate the (fictitious) object, is also the crucial element in Ryle’s ‘Imaginary Objects’ (also 1933). Goodman turns them into a predicate schema for fictitious subject matters as well as for a nominalist version of his account.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1-27 |
Number of pages | 27 |
Journal | Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy |
Volume | 12 |
Issue number | 5 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 7 Jun 2024 |
Austrian Fields of Science 2012
- 603109 Logic
- 603120 Philosophy of language
- 603104 History of philosophy