TY - JOUR

T1 - Managing the reputation of an award to motivate performance

AU - Gavrila, C

AU - Caulkins, J P

AU - Feichtinger, Gustav

AU - Tragler, Gernot

AU - Hartl, Richard

N1 - DOI: 10.1007/s001860400400
Affiliations: Univ. Studi di Roma Tor Vergata, Dipartimento di Matematica, Via della Ricerca Scientifica, I-00133 Roma, Italy; Carnegie Mellon University, H. John Heinz III Sch. Pub. Plcy./M., 5000 Forbes Ave., Pittsburgh, PA 15213, United States; Vienna University of Technology, Inst. for Math. Methods in Economics, Argentinierstr. 8/105-4, A-1040 Wien, Austria; University of Vienna, Institute of Management, Bruennerstr. 72, A-1210 Wien, Austria
Adressen: Gavrila, C.; Univ. Studi di Roma Tor Vergata; Dipartimento di Matematica; Via della Ricerca Scientifica I-00133 Roma, Italy; email: [email protected]
Source-File: 379Scopus.csv
Import aus Scopus: 2-s2.0-13944264002
Importdatum: 27.08.2007 08:22:26
22.10.2007: Datenanforderung 1927 (Import Sachbearbeiter)
22.10.2007: Datenanforderung 1928 (Import Sachbearbeiter)
07.11.2007: Datenanforderung 1966 (Import Sachbearbeiter)
07.11.2007: Datenanforderung 1977 (Import Sachbearbeiter)

PY - 2005

Y1 - 2005

N2 - Managers wish to motivate workers to exert effort. There is large literature on the use of wages and monetary incentives for this purpose, but in practice the "honor" or "prestige" of an award can be a significant motivator as well, unless the award is given so often that its prestige is diluted. The model here focuses on management of the reputation of an award that may or may not have a fixed monetary component. The model is an optimal dynamic control model, so its solution suggests how to manage the award over time. The analysis is interesting because of a "false" steady state that is adjacent to but outside the admissible region and which otherwise has the qualitative properties of a steady state; there are (infinitely many) trajectories converging to it and (infinitely many) trajectories starting arbitrarily close to it. For all initial conditions there are infinitely many candidates for the optimal solution that cannot be evaluated in the standard way. We resolve that problem by proving a new proposition concerning the value of the utility functional when the limit of the Hamiltonian is non-zero. Managerial implications are derived.

AB - Managers wish to motivate workers to exert effort. There is large literature on the use of wages and monetary incentives for this purpose, but in practice the "honor" or "prestige" of an award can be a significant motivator as well, unless the award is given so often that its prestige is diluted. The model here focuses on management of the reputation of an award that may or may not have a fixed monetary component. The model is an optimal dynamic control model, so its solution suggests how to manage the award over time. The analysis is interesting because of a "false" steady state that is adjacent to but outside the admissible region and which otherwise has the qualitative properties of a steady state; there are (infinitely many) trajectories converging to it and (infinitely many) trajectories starting arbitrarily close to it. For all initial conditions there are infinitely many candidates for the optimal solution that cannot be evaluated in the standard way. We resolve that problem by proving a new proposition concerning the value of the utility functional when the limit of the Hamiltonian is non-zero. Managerial implications are derived.

M3 - Review

VL - 61

SP - 1

EP - 22

JO - Mathematical Methods of Operations Research

JF - Mathematical Methods of Operations Research

SN - 1432-2994

IS - 1

ER -