Abstract
In many service applications, customers can request service dynamically during the service
time horizon and may be served the same day. For the service provider, these requests are
stochastic and due to working hour limitations, usually not all customer requests can be accepted for same-day service. Decisions are made about service acceptances and routing. The
objective is to maximize the expected number of accepted customers. Solution approaches can
be classified as being either selective regarding the customer acceptance or as being non-selective. Non-selective approaches accept every feasible request, while selective approaches
may decline same-day service although an acceptance would be feasible. This may save time
for further acceptances later and may enable more overall acceptances. In this paper, we present an experimental setup to analyze the impact of the customer acceptance mechanism on the
objective function and the “unfairness” within the service area. We show that selective customer acceptance mechanisms improve the objective value at the cost of a higher unfairness
compared to non-selective customer acceptance mechanisms.
time horizon and may be served the same day. For the service provider, these requests are
stochastic and due to working hour limitations, usually not all customer requests can be accepted for same-day service. Decisions are made about service acceptances and routing. The
objective is to maximize the expected number of accepted customers. Solution approaches can
be classified as being either selective regarding the customer acceptance or as being non-selective. Non-selective approaches accept every feasible request, while selective approaches
may decline same-day service although an acceptance would be feasible. This may save time
for further acceptances later and may enable more overall acceptances. In this paper, we present an experimental setup to analyze the impact of the customer acceptance mechanism on the
objective function and the “unfairness” within the service area. We show that selective customer acceptance mechanisms improve the objective value at the cost of a higher unfairness
compared to non-selective customer acceptance mechanisms.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Title of host publication | Proceedings of Logistik Management 2017 |
Editors | R.O. Large, N. Kramer, A.-K. Radig, M. Schäfer, A. Sulzbach |
Pages | 17-24 |
Publication status | Published - 2017 |
Externally published | Yes |
Austrian Fields of Science 2012
- 101015 Operations research
Keywords
- Dynamic vehicle routing
- Approximate dynamic programming
- Customer acceptances