R&D and Subsidy Policy with Imperfect Project Classification

Thomas Gehrig, Rune Stenbacka

Publications: Contribution to journalArticlePeer Reviewed

Abstract

We characterize optimal subsidies for firms facing limitations in their ability to correctly classify risky R&D projects. We demonstrate that the optimal subsidy is an increasing function of firms’ ability to reduce type-I errors in accepting projects with a success potential, and a decreasing function in their type-II error of adopting projects with no success potential. Moreover, the optimal subsidy is decreasing in the informational advantage regarding the assessment of project viability of private firms relative to the government.
Original languageEnglish
Article number110966
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume222
Early online dateJan 2023
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2023

Austrian Fields of Science 2012

  • 502013 Industrial economics
  • 502014 Innovation research

Keywords

  • Imperfect screening
  • R&D
  • Subsidy policy

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