Strict pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite-player games

Guilherme Carmona, Konrad Podczeck

Publications: Contribution to journalArticlePeer Reviewed


In the context of anonymous games (i.e., games where the payoff of a player is, apart from his/her own action, determined by the distribution of the actions made by the other players), we present a model in which, generically (in a precise sense), finite-player games have strict pure strategy Nash equilibria if the number of agents is large. A key feature of our model is that payoff functions have differentiability properties. A consequence of our existence result is that, in our model, equilibrium distributions of non-atomic games are asymptotically implementable by pure strategy Nash equilibria of large finite-player games.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1055-1093
Number of pages39
JournalTheoretical Economics
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2021

Austrian Fields of Science 2012

  • 502047 Economic theory


  • large games
  • pure strategy
  • Nash equilibrium
  • generic property
  • Large games
  • C72

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