Teams and individuals in standard auction formats: decisions and emotions

Maria Karmeliuk, Martin G. Kocher, Georg Schmidt

Publications: Contribution to journalArticlePeer Reviewed


Our study compares individual and team bidding in standard auction formats: first-price, second-price and ascending-price (English) auctions with independent private values. In a laboratory experiment, we find that individuals overbid more than teams in first-price auctions and deviate more from bidding their own value in second-price auctions. However, we observe no difference in bidding behavior in English auctions. Based on control variables, we provide evidence that the observed difference could be explained by better reasoning abilities of teams. Emotions seem to play a role in determining bids, but the effect of emotions on bidding does not differ between individuals and teams.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1327-1348
Number of pages22
JournalExperimental Economics
Issue number5
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2022

Austrian Fields of Science 2012

  • 502045 Behavioural economics
  • 502057 Experimental economics


  • Auctions
  • Experiment
  • Overbidding
  • Team decision-making


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