Abstract
Extended deterrence has been a main pillar of the security alliance between the United States and South Korea (Republic of Korea [ROK]) since the end of the Korean War. The changing dynamics of US extended deterrence in Korea, however, affected Seoul’s strategic choices within its bilateral alliance relationship with Washington. Examining the evolution of US extended deterrence in the Korean Peninsula until the Nixon administration, this article explains why South Korea began its nuclear weapons programme in a historical context of the US–ROK alliance relationship. This article argues that President Park Chung-hee’s increasing uncertainty about the US security commitment to South Korea in the 1960s led to his decision to develop nuclear weapons in the early 1970s despite the fact that US tactical nuclear weapons were still stationed in South Korea.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 502-520 |
Number of pages | 19 |
Journal | Journal of Strategic Studies |
Volume | 39 |
Issue number | 4 |
Early online date | 18 Apr 2016 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 6 Jun 2016 |
Austrian Fields of Science 2012
- 506017 Science and technology policy
- 601008 Science of history
- 506007 International relations
- 601022 Contemporary history
Keywords
- South Korea
- United States
- Extended Deterrence
- Nuclear Weapons
- US Troop Reduction