The Subject of 'We Intend'

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Abstract

This paper examines and compares the ways in which intentions of the singular kind ("I intend") and the plural kind ("we intend") are subjective. Are intentions of the plural kind ours in the same way intentions of the singular kind are mine? Starting with the singular case, it is argued that "I intend" is subjective in virtue of self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is special in that it is self-identifying, self-validating, self-committing, and self-authorizing. Moving to the plural form, it is argued that in spite of apparent differences, attitudes of the form "we intend" are subjective in the same way. The self-knowledge at work here is plural rather than singular. This supports a plural subject account of collective intentionality. It is argued that the worries sometimes raised in the literature against the metaphysical "spookiness" of plural subjects are due to a fundamental misconception of the way in which attitudes of either kind -singular and plural - are subjective.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)231-243
Number of pages13
JournalPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Volume17
Issue number2
Early online dateMar 2017
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2018

Austrian Fields of Science 2012

  • 603113 Philosophy

Keywords

  • Collective intentionality
  • Self-knowledge
  • Subjectivity
  • plural subject
  • Collective intentionality, plural subject

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