Abstract
In this article the authors identify and analyse points of agreement and disagreement between Michael Ayers and Charles Travis, starting from their views on ‘things before us’. The authors then try to spell out what separates these philosophers in matters concerning perception, knowledge and language. In spite of their both being self-professed realists, equally critical of conceptualism and representationalism, Ayers’ empiricism and Travis’ anti-empiricism lead them to different positions in these three areas. It is shown that in the case of Ayers they hinge on “ordinary” objects and a KK principle (knowledge that and how we know), whereas in the case of Travis they are articulated around occasion-sensitivity and anti-psychologism.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 584–599 |
Number of pages | 16 |
Journal | Grazer Philosophische Studien |
Volume | 98 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 19 Nov 2021 |
Austrian Fields of Science 2012
- 603120 Philosophy of language
- 603102 Epistemology
- 603110 Metaphysics
- 603114 Philosophy of mind
Keywords
- Ayers and Travis
- disjunctivism about knowledge
- disjunctivism about perception
- knowledge and language
- perception
- realism and empiricism
- Disjunctivism about knowledge
- Realism and empiricism
- Disjunctivism about perception
- Perception
- Knowledge and language