The value of confidential policy information: Persuasion, transparency, and influence

Clement Minaudier

Publications: Contribution to journalArticlePeer Reviewed

Abstract

Transparency of the lobbying process is hailed as an effective means to limit the influence of special interest groups, but should transparency also apply to the information obtained by policy makers (PMs)? This article extends theories of informational lobbying by explicitly modeling the choice of PMs to obtain information before interacting with lobbyists. This approach reveals a new channel for the value of confidentiality: extracting evidence from special interest groups. It shows that, counter-intuitively, the influence of special interest groups can increase as PMs become more expert. These results shed light on the relationship between confidentiality, good governance, and influence.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)570-612
Number of pages43
JournalThe Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization
Volume38
Issue number2
Early online date14 Dec 2021
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2022

Austrian Fields of Science 2012

  • 502047 Economic theory
  • 502027 Political economy

Keywords

  • lobbying
  • bureaucratic expertise
  • transparency
  • D73
  • DECISION
  • D78
  • INDUSTRY
  • LOBBY
  • FRIENDS
  • POLITICIANS
  • D72
  • D83
  • D82
  • SUBSIDIES
  • MAKER

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