Trust, Decision Rights Delegation, and Performance: The Case of Franchising

Marc Herz, Clemens Hutzinger, Haris Seferagic, Josef Windsperger

Publications: Contribution to journalArticlePeer Reviewed

Abstract

Previous research has not examined the relationship between trust, decentralization, and franchisor performance. Complementary to the literature on autonomy and relational governance from franchisees’ perspective, this study focuses on the franchisor's perspective on the impact of decentralization and trust on performance. Consistent with the embeddedness view, the results show that trust is a facilitator of decentralization in franchise networks, thereby increasing the positive performance effect of decision rights delegation. Overall, the study offers a new perspective on the relationship between formal governance—through decision rights allocation—and trust as a relational variable in interorganizational networks.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)973–991
Number of pages19
JournalJournal of Small Business Management
Volume54
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2016

Austrian Fields of Science 2012

  • 502044 Business management

Keywords

  • ALLIANCE GOVERNANCE
  • EXPLICIT KNOWLEDGE
  • FAMILIARITY BREED TRUST
  • FORMAL CONTRACTS
  • INTERORGANIZATIONAL TRUST
  • INTERPERSONAL-TRUST
  • PLURAL FORM
  • RELATIONAL GOVERNANCE
  • SUPPLIER RELATIONSHIPS
  • TRANSACTION-COST

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